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Two central assumptions of unconscious 
thought theory (UTT) are the capacity 
assumption and the weighting assumption. 
The capacity assumption states that uncon-
scious thought (UT) is unconstrained by 
cognitive capacity, thereby enabling people 
to make capacity-free choices when infor-
mation can be aggregated unconsciously. 
The weighting assumption states that the 
unconscious is better able to weight vari-
ous attributes by their relative importance. 
Ashby et al. (2011) present evidence chal-
lenging both of these assumptions. While 
the authors caution against overzealously 
applying UTT when making important 
decisions, they do not explicitly question 
the central claim of UTT: that an uncon-
scious mode of thought exists and oper-
ates differently from conscious processing 
of information (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 
2006). Nevertheless, Ashby et al.’s findings 
should motivate us to ask, first, is UTT a 
psychologically plausible theory of choice? 
And second, how can past work shown to 
support UTT, and the current work shown 
to contradict the model, be reconciled? We 
believe that the Ashby et al. paper begins to 
address both of these questions.
Is UTT a psychologically plausible model 
of choice? A good starting point to evalu-
ating the plausibility of any theory is to 
establish its a priori probability (formally, 
a Bayesian prior). The hypothesis that one 
can make better choices without explic-
itly thinking about the options is indeed a 
counter-intuitive and exciting possibility. 
But, with counter-intuitive theories comes 
skepticism in the form of low prior prob-
abilities (cf. Wagenmakers et al., 2011), and 
therefore the need for strong experimental 
evidence to change the skeptical Bayesian’s 
mind. Although Ashby et al. (2011) show 
some small advantages for UT for picking 
out the gamble with the highest expected 
value (EV) in some experiments, the effect is 
neither strong nor consistent across experi-
ments. For example, in Experiment 3 par-
ticipants in the UT condition did nominally 
worse than participants who were asked to 
deliberate without information, and signifi-
cantly worse than those participants who 
deliberated with information. Moreover, 
across all three experiments, participants 
who viewed the relevant information during 
a delay period either performed equivalent 
to or better than the unconscious deciders 
in terms of estimating the EVs of the gam-
bles. Taken together, these data fail to sup-
port the central claim of UTT, and therefore 
should lead the Bayesian to update his or 
her beliefs toward the null hypothesis – that 
no difference exists between unconscious 
and conscious deliberation. These results 
aside, it is instructive to evaluate how they 
square with other existing data on UTT. In 
an extensive analysis of 16 studies testing for 
an UT advantage, Newell and Rakow (2011) 
concluded that the evidence was decidedly 
in favor of the null when evaluated using 
Bayes Factors. Thus, regardless of how one 
interprets the findings of Ashby et al. (2011), 
one should be cautious in interpreting the 
significance of the UT advantage, if one 
exists.
Despite the questions surrounding ear-
lier results, Ashby et al. (2011) found, in 
their first two experiments, a subtle differ-
ence between conscious and unconscious 
processing: when asked to select among a 
series of gambles, unconscious deciders 
selected the highest EV gamble at a higher 
rate than the conscious deliberators. Given 
that all other aspects of the study are quite 
similar to earlier work, the critical differ-
ence may be the use of monetary gambles 
as stimuli. Using these monetary gambles 
assumes that individuals will use weights 
that are explicitly provided (as probabili-
ties), rather than developed over time. 
Earlier work in UTT has relied on weight-
ing of apartment or roommate attributes 
that develops with experience and over 
time (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006). 
Participants are also assumed to prefer 
gambles based on their EV, despite sub-
stantial evidence to suggest that other 
factors may influence gamble preference 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). The idea 
that expected utility may not be the default 
preference ordering adopted differentially 
by conscious deliberators is supported by 
Ashby et al.’s (2011) Experiment 3. When 
explicitly instructed to choose the gamble 
with the highest EV, they found no differ-
ence in performance for the conscious and 
unconscious thinkers.
Experiment 3, however, leaves the original 
difference between conscious deliberation 
without information and UT unexplained. 
Without explicit directions to choose the 
best EV gamble, the experimental manipu-
lation used to prevent conscious delibera-
tion produced a significantly higher rate of 
choosing the highest EV gamble compared 
to the case in which participants were free to 
deliberate in the absence of relevant infor-
mation (Experiments 1 and 2). However, 
when participants are explicitly incentivized 
to choose the best gamble (Experiment 3), 
there are no differences between UT and 
deliberation without information, but both 
conditions are worse than deliberation with 
information. As such, some explanation 
for this discrepancy must exist; if the UT 
does indeed yield benefits in performance, 
then why does the effect disappear when 
participants are incentivized to choose the 
best gamble?
How can the current study be recon-
ciled with conflicting earlier research? One 
possibility is that participants in the UT 
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tion. Indeed, when participants were incen-
tivized for choosing the best gamble, but 
not for minimizing EV error (Experiment 
3), there were no differences between the 
UT and deliberation without information 
conditions. The strategy switch hypothesis 
is hardly evidence for (or against, for that 
matter) an unconscious advantage, but 
merely a statement that people may do 
different things under different task con-
ditions. While the central tenants of UTT 
have been seriously challenged by Ashby 
et al., we believe that their results have 
opened the door to potential alternative 
explanations for the controversial hypoth-
esis that UT is more rational than conscious 
thought.
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condition adopt a different choice strategy 
than participants in the deliberation condi-
tion – one in which participants attempt to 
recall the single best gamble, but also where 
memory for the numerical values is poor. 
In contrast, participants in the deliberation 
condition attempt to compute the EV of 
each gamble, and as a result suffer from a 
build-up of memory interference through-
out the deliberation stage (Lassiter et al., 
2009). A switch in strategy from computing 
EV to recall of a single best gamble would 
be sufficient to account for the pattern 
of results in all three experiments: When 
instructions incentivize computation of 
EV (Experiments 1 and 2) a deliberative 
strategy that involves computation would 
yield relatively lower errors in EV computa-
tions, but perhaps at the cost of accurately 
retrieving the best gamble. In contrast, a 
simple recall strategy without explicit com-
putation would result in  relatively better 
recall of the best gamble, but perhaps at 
the cost of greater error in EV computa-
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